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Abstract 
This essay analyses the representation of mental processes in James Joyce’s 
Ulysses in light of “scientific” or “experimental” psychology, whose impact on 
the composition of the novel has been quite underestimated. Since concepts 
such as “unconscious cerebration” and “mental latency”, or the theorisation of 
a close connection between dreams and repression, regularly appeared in 
nineteenth-century psychological treatises along with discussions of insanity 
and deranged states of consciousness, these ideas are likely to have made 
inroads into the cultural milieu in which Ulysses was composed. By analysing 
the stratified representation of the characters’ minds, this essay attempts to read 
the novel through a focus on pre-Freudian conceptions of unconscious mental 
processes and latent memory, and to show that some of the ideas propounded 
by early psychologists may have provided the substance for Joyce’s 
understanding of the functioning of consciousness, the unconscious and 
memory portrayed in Ulysses. 
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This essay analyses the representation of mental processes in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses in light of “scientific” or “experimental” psychology, 
which gradually emerged as an autonomous discipline and an 
experimental science of the mind in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This innovative field was characterised by the rigorous 
observation of physiological phenomena – hence the alternative labels 
of “physiological” or “empirical” psychology – and the use of the 
experimental method. Reading the stream-of-consciousness technique 
or the focus on inner life which characterises modernist fiction in terms 
of the interplay between psychology and literature has become a critical 
commonplace, as several studies on the literary appropriation of 
psychological discourse demonstrate. Martin Jay, for instance, remarks 
that the multiple intersections between aesthetic modernism and the 
richly articulated field of modern psychology, both characterised by 
radical developments taking place at virtually the same time, are based 
on «an unprecedented preoccupation with the interior landscape of the 
subject», which «led to voyages of scientific and artistic discovery» 
(1996: 93). A similar case has been made, more recently, by Mark Micale: 
while observing that the far-reaching changes in Western culture 
brought by the advent of modernism «occurred precisely when the 
distinctively modern disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, and 
psychoanalysis began to establish their “scientific” foundations» (2004: 
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1), he also notes – as Judith Ryan does in The Vanishing Subject: Early 
Psychology and Literary Modernism (1991) – that within the well-
established scholarly debate concerning the influence of new models of 
the mind on the depiction of characters’ subjectivity in early twentieth-
century literature, pride of place has been given to the psychoanalytical 
theories of Freud and Jung, to the detriment of some of their 
predecessors and contemporaries, whose impact on modernist writing 
was much greater than is generally realised. According to Micale, it is 
fundamental to bear in mind that «psychoanalysis was only one of many 
emerging models of mind that comprised the coming of early dynamic 
psychiatry and that contributed to the constitution of the modern 
psychological self» (2004: 7).  
In his illuminating study Dynamic Psychology in Modernist British 
Fiction, George Johnson similarly remarks that, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, «a particularly close, symbiotic relationship 
developed between the novel and a cluster of discourses pertaining to 
selfhood that were labelled “the new psychology”, or, more accurately, 
dynamic psychology» (2006: 1). However, «the admittedly important 
findings of Sigmund Freud have been so magnified and divorced from 
their sources that they have overshadowed and in some cases 
obliterated earlier significant advances in psychological knowledge» 
(ibid.: 208). Furthermore, he adds that the debate about psychoanalysis 
only began to emerge in Britain around 1908, and that, by the outbreak 
of the First World War, Freud’s theories on hysteria, sexuality, dreams 
and repression had been introduced and widely discussed. Therefore, 
psychoanalysis can be said to represent a later manifestation of that new 
approach to understanding the inner workings of the human mind 
which was already strongly present in the cultural climate at the turn of 
the century, and which was increasingly including the exceptional and 
the deviant, as the realms of dynamic psychology or psychical research 
clearly demonstrate. Though it is not the aim of this essay to penetrate 
the domain of spiritualistic or occult psychology, it seems important to 
keep in mind, as Henri Ellenberger reminds us in his monumental The 
Discovery of the Unconscious (1994), that tendencies in the field of 
dynamic psychology other than the later psychoanalytical wave were 
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already much in vogue at the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
thus likely to have made inroads into the cultural milieu in which 
modernist masterpieces such as Joyce’s Ulysses were composed.  
Furthermore, while Freud is generally credited with having 
advanced a revolutionary theory of the human mind according to which 
psychical symptoms are often the surface manifestations of deeply 
repressed conflicts, we should not forget that concepts such as William 
Carpenter’s “unconscious cerebration” and William Hamilton’s “mental 
latency” regularly appeared in nineteenth-century treatises on the 
newborn science of psychology. The notion of latent thought, active and 
dynamic but beyond human control or the threshold of consciousness, 
was of central importance to the conception of self from the mid-
Victorian period throughout the twentieth century. Analogously, the 
deep interest raised at that time by “deranged” states of consciousness 
can be said to have paved the way for – though not immediately 
prefigured – Freud’s studies on hysteria and neurosis, which led him to 
formulate the theory that the unconscious mind governs behaviour to a 
greater extent than people are normally aware. As Alison Winter 
explains in her comprehensive study of the rise and fall of mesmerism 
in Britain, the unconscious today is a notion laden with Freudian 
baggage, which has «charged this term in a way that makes it misleading 
when applied to the early and mid-Victorians» (1998: 10). To revert to its 
pre-Freudian significance implies restoring to it the original multiplicity 
of a conceptual umbrella gathering approaches which were widely 
different, though sharing a basic concern of Victorian mental theories, 
that is how, and to what extent, are visible actions and behaviours 
governed by non-rational processes beyond conscious control. 
In the cultural context of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, in which the new science of the mind widely permeated 
intellectual debate, the literary imaginary was inevitably influenced by 
innovative theories of selfhood, memory, consciousness or the 
unconscious, as well as their pathological alterations, formulated within 
the field of coeval psychological investigation. As Roger Smith has 
effectively pointed out, «psychology in Britain was shaped in a public 
arena, not through the specialization or differentiation of academic life» 
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(2004: 83); moreover, the periodical press played a major role in 
moulding «a discourse about psychology as part of a public, non-
specialist culture» (ibid.: 98). Therefore, a key assumption in the present 
study is that fiction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
participated in contemporary debates about the nature of sensory 
perceptions, conscious and unconscious processes as well as memory, 
and shaped the way psychologists – who often developed their 
arguments through literary allusions and tropes, or referred to cases 
from novels as well as real life to illustrate their points – wrote about the 
powers and mysteries of the mind. Scholars like Rick Rylance (2000) and 
Erik Lindberg (2000), among others, have variously emphasised this 
phenomenon, which extends from the Victorian age, when psychology 
emerged as an autonomous discipline, to the modernist period, 
characterised by further theoretical advancements. In a thought-
provoking study of the substrate in which early twentieth-century 
culture is rooted, Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth maintain 
that 
The relationship between the conscious and the unconscious 
mind and the significance and workings of memory were central to 
the debate about the nature of individual and social identity during 
the nineteenth century. [...] And although they [Victorian 
psychologists] did not directly prefigure Freud’s work their writing 
was an important part of the intellectual context within which 
psychoanalytic theory arose. In mid-nineteenth-century Britain, the 
interest in what William Carpenter termed “unconscious 
cerebration” was closely connected to the growing enquiry into 
modes of insanity and the uncertain division between “deranged” 
and “sane” states of mind. As with the specific accounts of 
phrenology, mesmerism, and the various forms of insanity, mid-
century debates on “latent thought” or the “automatic action” of 
the mind wavered between a desire to explore and to control the 
self. (1998: 67)  
In line with the general scholarly interest in psychoanalytical 
psychology and consequent neglect of empirical or experimental 
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psychology in relation to modernist literature, the importance of the 
latter in the cultural milieu in which Ulysses was written has been quite 
underestimated. Although scholars – primarily Richard Ellmann in his 
1965 biography – have often pointed out Joyce’s disavowal of interest 
and even aversion to psychoanalysis, there is an extensive bibliography 
on the subject1, while (to the best of my knowledge) there has not yet 
been an attempt, other than John Rickard’s, to analyse previous models 
of consciousness and theories of memory which may have influenced 
Joyce’s representation of psychic phenomena. In his seminal study 
entitled Joyce’s Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of Ulysses, Rickard 
contends that 
Ulysses functions as a site of struggle or tension between 
competing philosophical and psychological conceptions of the 
nature of human subjectivity and the role of memory within that 
subjectivity or selfhood. Ulysses – shaped both by the dominant 
philosophical and psychological discourses of its own time and by 
older models of mind or self – enacts or works through the struggle 
between these often incompatible models rather than presenting 
one version or model of subjectivity. (1999: 3) 
In his illustration of what he terms, following Cheryl Herr (1987), 
Ulysses’s “cultural unconscious” – that is, the intellectual substrate 
which informed the novel – the critic frequently mentions Freud and 
Jung, but he does so alongside William James, Henri Bergson, Michael 
Maher and others. Furthermore, Ellmann’s listing of the volumes 
contained in Joyce’s Trieste library, appended to his 1977 study The 
Consciousness of Joyce, provides a treasury of clues about the author’s 
 
1 Joyce’s bold claim to Djuna Barnes in a 1922 interview has now become 
proverbial: «in Ulysses I have recorded, simultaneously, what a man says, sees, 
thinks, and what such seeing, thinking, saying does, to what you Freudians 
call the subconscious – but as for psychoanalysis, [...] it’s neither more nor less 
than blackmail» (Barnes 1922: 65, also qtd. in Ellmann 1982: 524). 
Psychoanalytic studies of Joyce include, among several others, Brivic 1980; 
Friedman 1993; Kimball 1983 and 1991; Shechner 1974; Thurston 2004.  
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reading habits in the crucial period in his artistic development 
comprised between 1904 and 19202. The variety of the books that Joyce 
collected while he was writing Ulysses, and that he left behind him in 
Trieste when he moved to Paris in 1920, reflects the range of specific 
intellectual needs that he felt during the composition of his masterpiece 
and shows that the author may have been far more interested than he 
ever admitted in the psychoanalytical discourse of the time. As Wim 
Van Mierlo has more recently pointed out, however, it was not until a 
set of notes, taken from the third volume of Freud’s Collected Papers, was 
discovered in one of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake notebooks that some 
evidence of a direct contact with the psychoanalytical intertext could be 
found. In his view, «the genetic connections [...] allow a further 
contextualization of Joyce’s contact with the New Psychology» (Van 
Mierlo 1997: 116) and demonstrate that the author «was able to draw on 
psychoanalytical writings without necessarily subscribing to a 
psychoanalytic agenda» (ibid.). Although such evidence is perhaps not 
necessary, since psychoanalysis was very much in the air in the late 
1910s and 20s, it is in any case particularly instructive that among the 
volumes owned by Joyce one can find Freud’s Eine Kindheitserinnerung 
des Leonardo da Vinci (Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, 
1910) and Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, 1917), Jung’s Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des 
Einzelnen (The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual, 
1909), along with Michael Maher’s Psychology: Empirical and Rational 
(second American edition, date unknown). Joyce’s knowledge of this 
book is particularly relevant to the purpose of the present study, not 
only for its intrinsic value as illustration of the scholar’s personal views 
 
2 For a list of the items in the collection, see Ellmann 1977: 97-134, as well 
as Gillespie 1986. Elsewhere, Gillespie cites Ellmann’s catalogue as «the only 
detailed source for information on Joyce’s reading over the period during 
which he was writing the majority of the works which make up his canon» 
(1983: 19). Such findings caused Ellmann to reconsider the question of Joyce’s 
dismissal of psychoanalytical theories that he had often addressed in the first 
edition of his biography (1965).  
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on the most commonly debated psychological issues of the time, but also 
because it represents a compendium of preceding and coeval 
psychological doctrines and offers historical outlines of contemporary 
scientific concerns such as mental faculties, sensory perception and 
memory. While it is far from certain that Joyce may have read or directly 
known about nineteenth-century psychological theories, Maher’s 
explicit mention of Carpenter and Hamilton along with Gustav Fechner, 
William James, G.H. Lewes, Théodule Ribot, Dugald Stewart and James 
Sully – among others – is likely to have provided a sort of mediation. 
Joyce’s habit of quoting extensively from other works of the Western 
canon, of layering or “seeding” the text of Ulysses with traces of older 
texts and traditions, makes it evident that these borrowings extended far 
beyond the books that make up the Trieste library. However, the 
presence of Maher’s treatise can be seen as evidence of the fact that Joyce 
had an interest in the “new psychology” and included a variety of 
psychological ideas in his novel. 
Tracing the impact of the most significant European psychological 
discourse on the composition of Joyce’s Ulysses – a text notoriously 
appropriating, reworking and even subverting countless texts and 
discourses – could seem risky. Though exploring potential sources, this 
study moves beyond the implications of influence and concerns itself 
with some of the works and theories that may have provided the 
substance for Joyce’s understanding of the functioning of mind, 
consciousness, the unconscious and memory represented in his 
masterpiece. The intellectual climate in which Ulysses was composed 
was dominated – in both specialist discourse, circulating widely through 
the popular press, and common knowledge – by a materialist science of 
the self which rejected dualistic separations of body and mind, and 
which was at the same time fascinated and unsettled by those inner 
regions that remained beyond conscious control. Moving from the 
assumption that there are complex and diverse ways in which literature 
and science were interwoven and mutually influential in the Victorian 
as well as in the modernist period, this essay aims to explore the 
extensive connections between literary and psychological discussions of 
the way the mind functions, as well as the participation of fictive 
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narrative in the province of emergent psychology of the unconscious 
and memory science. Therefore, it proposes to offer new insights into 
Joyce’s Ulysses – a novel that is entirely permeated by psychological 
language and theory, and constantly reflects on issues under debate in 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century psychological texts – 
through a focus on pre-Freudian conceptions of unconscious mental 
processes and latent memory. As the editors of the thought-provoking 
collection Cognitive Joyce point out in their introduction, «in Ulysses, the 
exceptionally-detailed, true-to-life portrayal of the human mind is a 
constant concern of the narrative, whichever character we may be 
following» (Belluc - Bénéjam 2018: 2). Furthermore, it seems evident that 
Joyce incorporated a variety of psychological notions in Ulysses, often 
displaying his familiarity with the scientific language of psychology. 
This chiefly occurs in the verbose and pedantic style of episodes such as 
“Eumaeus” – whose corresponding organ is “nerves” – and “Ithaca”, 
where one can find a number of revealing passages: «his mental organs 
for the moment refusing to dictate further» (U 16.788-89)3; «as if both 
their minds were travelling, so to speak, in the one train of thought» (U 
16.1580-81); «What suddenly arrested his ingress?/The right temporal 
lobe of the hollow sphere of his cranium came into contact with a solid 
timber angle where, an infinitesimal but sensible fraction of a second 
later, a painful sensation was located in consequence of antecedent 
sensations transmitted and registered» (U 17.1274-78); «Why, firstly and 
secondly, did he not consult the work in question?/Firstly, in order to 
exercise mnemotechnic: secondly, because after an interval of amnesia, 
when, seated at the central table, about to consult the work in question, 
he remembered by mnemotechnic the name of the military engagement, 
Plevna» (U 17.1421-25). Such excerpts demonstrate the author’s 
acquaintance with, and even highly ironic use of, nineteenth-century 
psychophysiological theories of mental blocks, or obstructions in the 
 
3 Joyce, James, Ulysses: The Corrected Text, Ed. Hans Walter Gabler, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986; hereafter cited by episode and line number 
as U. 
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flow of thoughts and mnemonic associations; the well-known metaphor 
of the “train of thought”, applied to conscious as well as unconscious 
mental activity (and which was also believed to be able to transmigrate 
from one subject to another, as popular reports on experiments in 
telepathy and mesmerism attested); the idea of the localisation of mental 
functions and sensations in specific areas of the brain, first introduced 
by phrenologists and also referred to in Maher’s Psychology; and, last but 
not least, the systematic attempts to improve the efficiency of memory 
which were very much in the news in the late nineteenth century. This 
and other evidence clearly shows, as Van Mierlo also suggests, that 
«despite his frequent attacks on psychoanalysis, Joyce was not at all 
averse to the subject of psychology» (1997: 123), and that his treatment 
of the discipline was also aimed at rendering the chaos in cognitions 
about human mental functioning often generated by manifold, always 
evolving and sometimes contrasting models and doctrines. 
One of the most common conceptions in coeval psychological 
theories, which directly or indirectly found their way into Ulysses, was 
the idea of a correlation between psychical (inner, hidden) and physical 
(outer, manifest) phenomena. The British psychophysiologists (in 
particular Henry Holland, G.H. Lewes, William Carpenter) were 
distinguished authors of treatises on psychology in connection with 
cerebral physiology. They sought to elucidate the correlation between 
mind and brain, between the intellectual and physical functions, as well 
as the mental manifestations of the nervous system. They essentially 
followed current lines of research demonstrating that reflex actions 
extend to the brain and produce acts of which we may be cognisant 
because of their effects, but over which we exercise no volitional control. 
Another interesting dichotomy characterising Joyce’s representation of 
mental phenomena is that of consciousness (what is observable and 
superficial) versus the unconscious (what is concealed and submerged). 
Furthermore, as Rickard remarks, «images of burial and exhumation 
abound in Ulysses, surfacing frequently in the thoughts of both Stephen 
and Bloom» (1999: 56), and acting as «metaphors for the repression of 
unpleasant or disturbing memories and for the inevitable way that these 
memories return over and over again to consciousness» (ibid.). He also 
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notes that Freud, who took great interest in the unearthing of Pompeii 
and found in archaeological excavation a metaphor for the 
psychoanalytic recovery of the past, may provide an interesting parallel 
to Joyce in his development of similar metaphors for the workings of 
repression. If Freud’s assimilation of archaeology into his topographical 
model of the mind has been well excavated, I would also add, however, 
that nineteenth-century theories of the unconscious, widely 
disseminated in popular culture, anticipated both Freud’s attempt to 
unearth the human psyche and the use of archaeological metaphors, 
often conceiving the reading of dreams as a means of exploring the 
intricate archaeology of the mind. 
Following Ellenberger’s claim that, in nineteenth-century dynamic 
psychology, dream, hypnotism (formerly known as magnetic or 
mesmeric sleep), spontaneous somnambulism and related trance-like 
states were adopted as the main approach to the unconscious, several 
scholars have recently focused attention on Victorian watershed 
developments in the physiology of sleep and dreamy mental states. 
Natalya Lusty and Helen Groth, for instance, have questioned a «neat 
epistemic break between nineteenth- and twentieth-century approaches 
to dreaming» (2013: 7), thus demonstrating that Freud’s psychoanalysis 
did not necessarily herald the emergence of modern dream theory as 
many scholars suppose. In the period under consideration, dreams and 
other dreamlike states could be nebulous concepts. Therefore, the 
categorisation of dreamy kinds of mental events was irregular and 
contested, and the uncertain status of dream-states had remarkable 
implications for the notions of consciousness and selfhood. The keen 
interest in dreams as revelation of a deeper self or otherwise submerged 
layers of the mind underwent significant shifts during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, culminating in James Sully’s groundbreaking 
essay “The Dream as a Revelation” (published in 1893 in the influential 
Fortnightly Review), which Freud would approvingly cite in his own The 
Interpretation of Dreams a few years later, chiefly with reference to the 
palimpsest metaphor. As Groth elsewhere points out, «Sully’s dream 
interpretation is equally concerned with the generative interplay 
between chaos and order, surface and depth» (2014: 114); moreover, he 
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employs numerous images of layering and stratifications which 
frequently appeared in the psychological discourse of the time. For 
instance, in his study not only does Sully argue that, «like some 
palimpsest, the dream discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters 
traces of an old and precious communication» (qtd. in Bourne Taylor - 
Shuttleworth 1998: 121); he also refers to an «unveiling during sleep of 
the more instinctive layers of our mental life» (ibid.: 118), or an 
«emergence into the full light of consciousness of deeper and 
customarily veiled strata of our nature» (ibid.: 118–19). By conceiving 
dreams as revelations allowing «the overlaid strata of old experience to 
come to light again» (ibid.: 120), he contends, «we may learn much 
concerning that organic substrate of our conscious personality which 
links us on to the animal series» (ibid.: 119). As Sully puts it, his 
conception mainly derives from contemporary envisaging of the brain 
as «a hierarchy of organs, the higher and later evolved seeming to 
control, and in a measure to repress, the functional activities of the lower 
and earlier» (ibid.: 118).  
Dreams and repression, for instance, are closely related in Ulysses 
when Stephen Dedalus is involuntarily confronted with the ghostly 
apparition of his mother – for whose death he feels deep remorse – first 
during sleep in “Telemachus” and then in one of the hallucinatory 
visions in “Circe”. Such revenant is clearly the materialisation of the 
character’s repressed memories, showing that some images and 
recollections have the power to come back as forcefully as one tries to 
elude them: 
In a dream, silently, she had come to him, her wasted body 
within its loose graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and 
rosewood, her breath, bent over him with mute secret words, a faint 
odour of wetted ashes. Her glazing eyes, staring out of death, to 
shake and bend my soul. On me alone. The ghostcandle to light her 
agony. Ghostly light on the tortured face. Her hoarse loud breath 
rattling in horror, while all prayed on their knees. Her eyes on me 
to strike me down. Liliata rutilantium te confessorum turma circumdet: 
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iubilantium te virginum chorus excipiat. Ghoul! Chewer of corpses! 
No, mother. Let me be and let me live. (U 1.270-79) 
STEPHEN: Ho!  
(Stephen’s mother, emaciated, rises stark through the floor, in leper grey 
with a wreath of faded orangeblossoms and a torn bridal veil, her face worn 
and noseless, green with gravemould. Her hair is scant and lank. She fixes 
her bluecircled hollow eyesockets on Stephen and opens her toothless 
mouth uttering a silent word. A choir of virgins and confessors sing 
voicelessly.)  
THE CHOIR: Liliata rutilantium te confessorum .... 
Iubilantium te virginum ..... (U 15.4155-65) 
In these excerpts such an evil, repressed memory, which is 
distorted by Stephen’s sense of guilt for not praying on his mother’s 
deathbed, is so vivid as to become – as seems appropriate to a dream or 
a visionary, expressionistic, hallucinatory episode like “Circe” – the 
apparition of a ghost, and is clearly a twisted projection of the past onto 
the present, since the revenant comes back from the dead bearing traces 
of the original scene impressed on Stephen’s mind mixed with elements 
of fantasy. The latter passage can be easily interpreted as typical Circean 
dream play or reverie, where spectral presences haunt the minds of the 
living and repeated phrases or leitmotifs haunt the text of the novel. 
However, it is also a complex literary representation of Freudian and 
pre-Freudian theories of the return of the repressed, especially 
considering Stephen’s previous attempt to free himself from the burden 
of the past by uttering in despair «No, mother. Let me be and let me 
live». Therefore, by analysing the stratified representation of the 
characters’ minds in Ulysses, as well as a series of dichotomies arising 
from the depiction of their inner life – changing surface versus 
sedimented depth, submerged/repressed past versus conscious present 
– it is possible to show that some of the ideas propounded by early 
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psychologists may have provided the substance for Joyce’s 
understanding of the workings of mind, consciousness, the unconscious 
and memory portrayed in his masterpiece. 
The field of physiological psychology in the mid-nineteenth 
century sought a theory of the mind which could explain varying and 
often troubling states of consciousness. As Anne Harrington argues in 
Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain (1987), Victorian mental science put 
a great emphasis on the notion of the duality of the mind or “double 
consciousness”, generally considered as a type of disorder concerning 
associative mechanisms or a form of disrupted memory. The label was 
variously applied to a spectrum of mental states ranging from insanity 
and dual personalities to dreams, reverie, somnambulism and 
mesmerism, and was generally based on what was known in neurology 
as “double brain”, or the notion that each hemisphere of the brain might 
function as a distinct organ. All of this definitely reinforced popular 
fascination with the hidden movements of the mind outside conscious 
control. The assumption that personal identity mainly consisted of 
different layers – or, better, of an unconscious, deep self, created through 
different strands of latent memory and underlying a conscious, 
superficial self – often intersected with the physiological argument that 
the reason for such division was to be found in the structure of the brain. 
For instance, the authoritative British physicians Henry Holland and 
Arthur Wigan took a close interest in recollection and its pathological 
alterations, advancing the thesis that not only was the brain a double 
organ, but also that the cerebrum actually consisted of two distinct and 
separate brains, working either with or against each other, and thus 
possibly generating conditions of insanity or mental disorder. In his 
Chapters on Mental Physiology (1852), undoubtedly one of the most 
influential psychological studies to be published in the mid-nineteenth 
century, Holland formulated the concept of “double consciousness” 
seen as related to disorders in associative and mnemonic mechanisms. 
He claimed that 
It has been a familiar remark that in certain states of mental 
derangement, as well as in some cases of hysteria which border 
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closely upon it, there appear, as it were, two minds [...]. If the latter 
explanation be admitted, then the cases just mentioned come under 
the description of what has been termed double consciousness; where 
the mind passes by alternation from one state to another, each 
having the perception of external impressions and appropriate 
trains of thought, but not linked together by the ordinary 
gradations, or by mutual memory. (1852: 185-87) 
Holland’s description – applying to all those phenomena in which 
there is a disruption in the unity of consciousness and mutual memory 
is absent – was taken to extremes by Wigan in his treatise entitled A New 
View of Insanity: The Duality of the Mind (1844), where he argued that the 
human mind is split between competing physical and moral brains, 
setting up a physically divided moral dichotomy. Wigan purported to 
prove 
that each cerebrum is a distinct and perfect whole, as an organ of 
thought. That a separate and distinct process of thinking or 
ratiocination may be carried on in each cerebrum simultaneously. 
[...] That from the apparent division of each cerebrum into three 
lobes, it is a natural and reasonable presumption that the three 
portions have distinct offices. (1844: 26-29) 
Though sometimes considered as speculative at that time, such 
theories directly or indirectly paved the way for modern neuroscience 
and the study of the localisation of mental functions in specific parts of 
the brain, which had already been anticipated by Lavater’s 
physiognomy and Gall’s phrenology. Regardless of their scientific 
validity, the immense popularity of these notions cannot be denied, as 
shown by Joyce’s allusion in “Circe” to “your knowledge bump” (U 
15.2095), that is the phrenologists’ assumption that particular mental 
faculties were localised in precise regions of the brain, and that the 
strength of a given faculty was evidenced by the prominence of its 
region in the skull. 
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In the second half of the nineteenth century the concept of “double 
consciousness” continued to be discussed as an extreme state of 
disordered association or disrupted memory and formed part of a much 
wider debate concerning the presence of hidden traces within the mind. 
William Hamilton’s theory of “latent mental modification” remained a 
major influence on later psychological writing and in all subsequent 
debates on the presence of latent traces in human thought. In his Lectures 
on Metaphysics (1877), Hamilton moves from the assumption that «the 
infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures, lies always beyond the 
sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind» (1877: 
339). After distinguishing three degrees of what he calls “mental 
latency”, he concludes that «the sphere of our conscious modifications 
is only a small circle in the centre of a wider sphere of action and passion, 
of which we are only conscious through its effects» (ibid.: 349). 
Hamilton’s theory was also mentioned in William Carpenter’s pivotal 
treatise entitled Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), whose aim was to 
develop and reinterpret typical associationist assumptions by 
establishing a materialist analysis of the mind. Carpenter advances his 
theory of “unconscious cerebration” also in connection with the 
widespread notion of a difference between voluntary and involuntary 
memory. Quite interestingly, he describes this faculty in terms of 
superposed layers, namely as the “storing-up” of mental representations 
leaving an indelible trace on our present states of mind: 
Now there is very strong Physiological reason to believe that this 
“storing-up of ideas” in the Memory is the psychological 
expression of physical changes in the Cerebrum, by which 
ideational states are permanently registered or recorded; so that 
any “trace” left by them, although remaining so long outside the 
“sphere of consciousness” as to have seemed non-existent, may be 
revived again in full vividness under certain special conditions. 
(1874: 436) 
Eventually, it was chiefly to the connection between conscious and 
unconscious memory that most discussions on the self or the role of 
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recollection in shaping personal identity reverted. While nineteenth-
century psychologists recognised that the sense of a continuous self 
depends on the awareness of the connections between past and present 
experiences, they also acknowledged that memory actually contains 
much more than what we consciously recall, and may act as a repository 
of latent impressions. For instance, in his Psychology: Empirical and 
Rational, Maher considered memory both a conservative and a 
reproductive faculty essentially based on the mechanism of association, 
or better as 
the faculty of retaining, reproducing, and recognizing 
representations of past experiences. [...] During the whole of our life 
the greater portion of our mental possessions lies below the surface 
of consciousness, and exist only in a condition of potential 
resuscitation. It is the power of recalling and recognizing these 
dormant cognitions which completes and perfects this instrument 
of knowledge. (1890: 179) 
The author also referred to the notions – recurring in contemporary 
intellectual debate – of «spontaneous or automatic memory, and voluntary 
memory, or the power of recollection» (ibid.: 180). It is noteworthy that, 
among the most common metaphors for such stratified conceptions of 
the self, one can find the archaeological analogy, in which the past is 
continually brought to the surface and thus made present, or the notion 
of palimpsest, representative of a vision of personal identity according 
to which memories and experiences are superposed but never erased. 
To quote a revealing example, in his Problems of Life and Mind (1874) G.H. 
Lewes – a novelist and journalist who also wrote extensively on psycho-
physiological issues – contended that the mind 
is not a passive recipient of external impressions, but an active 
co-operant. [...] What the Senses inscribe on it, are not merely the 
changes of the external world; but these characters are commingled 
with the characters of preceding inscriptions. The sensitive subject 
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is no tabula rasa: it is not a blank sheet of paper, but a palimpsest. 
(1874: 162) 
As mentioned before, the notion of the palimpsest is particularly 
useful to account for the textual representation of consciousness, the 
unconscious and memory in Ulysses, characterised by countless 
refractions, stratifications and overlaps. As Susan Stanford Friedman 
puts it, «like a palimpsest, both psyche and literary text are layered, with 
repressed elements erupting in disguised forms onto the manifest 
surface of consciousness, of a text» (1992: 58). Therefore, Joyce’s novel, 
actually a text where ghostly traces of former and coeval writings still 
remain, can be said to develop enduring metaphors for the architecture 
and workings of the human mind as well as eclectic, multi-layered 
constructions of selfhood which reverberated throughout the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. For instance, the fundamental role played 
by memory in the construction of personal identity acquires central 
importance in Ulysses and manifests itself as a delicate balance between 
the threat of a possible dissolution of the self and the function of 
recollection, which accumulates both personal experiences and 
narrative fragments in a coherent and teleological sequence. Moreover, 
it also calls into question notions of continuity and discontinuity, unity 
and fragmentation, surface and depth. The tension between the need to 
remember and the desire to leave behind one’s past, along with the 
creation of a continuous conception of selfhood through the powers of 
personal memory, deeply concern the protagonists of the novel. 
Memory in Ulysses sometimes deals with the desire to recover a past that 
cannot be brought back, but more often with the attempt to conceal and 
restrain it. Since earlier experiences are frequently so unpleasant as to be 
resisted and repressed, another significant instance of stratification in 
the representation of the characters’ subjectivity is the dichotomy 
between conscious present and submerged past, or between memory 
and repression, consciousness and the unconscious. The text of the novel 
thus resonates with psychological theories concerning the presence of 
latent traces of past events, thoughts and memories suddenly emerging 
and becoming manifest in the ordinary functioning of mental processes. 
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Several nineteenth-century psychologists paved the way for Freudian 
psychoanalysis in emphasising the capacity of powerful emotional 
experiences to leave enduring traces upon the mind, which represented 
an opportunity to explore altered mental states and recover submerged 
memories inaccessible to ordinary consciousness. Notions of shock and 
trauma, closely related to ideas about unconscious knowledge and 
conscious recall, formed a crucial aspect of the way in which 
physiological psychology envisaged the interdependence of 
consciousness, memory and the emotions, or attempted to think through 
the relations between mind and body. As Jill Matus interestingly 
remarks, «the term “trauma” emerged in the late nineteenth century 
when the label for a physical wound came to be associated with a mental 
state» (2009: 7). This notion clearly presupposed that «the mind had to 
be conceived of as physical, material and physiological – and therefore 
vulnerable – like the body» (ibid.). In reading Ulysses, therefore, it is 
compelling to focus attention on models of the unconscious at work in 
literary representations of a self whose wounds are invisible, but 
detectable in aberrations of mind, memory, affect and dream which, 
though linked in materialist science to the physical, are also associated 
with the psychological sphere.  
Both Bloom and Stephen must face psychological impasses in their 
lives, that is, blocks and obstructions essentially deriving from 
dysfunctions of memory, or rather from a problematic relationship with 
traumatic occurrences such as Rudolph Virag’s suicide or the deaths of 
May Dedalus and Rudy Bloom. In parallel with nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century interest in the disruption of associative and 
mnemonic mechanisms, characters in Ulysses are paralysed by crucial 
experiences and by the consequent difficulty in remembering or coping 
with them. Furthermore, reproducing phenomena known as 
“unconscious cerebration” or “mental latency”, the text of the novel 
manifests the characters’ attempts to repress unpleasant thoughts or 
recollections which come back as vehemently as one tries to evade them. 
For instance, the traumatic event of Rudolph Virag’s suicide is a 
persistent psychological impasse for the protagonist of Ulysses, who 
tries, to no avail, to overcome it. The loss of his father represents a 
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disturbing memory that frequently flashes through Bloom’s mind 
provoking a deep sense of guilt. In the following extract from “Lotus-
Eaters”, the thoughts and visual perceptions combining in Bloom’s 
stream of consciousness give rise, almost by chance, to the sudden 
recollection of Virag’s death – activated by the idea of Ophelia’s suicide 
in Shakespeare’s Hamlet – while seeing a playbill in the street, and 
repressed immediately after: 
Mr Bloom stood at the corner, his eyes wandering over the 
multicoloured hoardings. Cantrell and Cochrane’s Ginger Ale 
(Aromatic). Clery’s Summer Sale. No, he’s going on straight. Hello. 
Leah tonight. Mrs Bandman Palmer. Like to see her again in that. 
Hamlet she played last night. Male impersonator. Perhaps he was 
a woman. Why Ophelia committed suicide. Poor papa! How he 
used to talk of Kate Bateman in that. Outside the Adelphi in London 
waited all the afternoon to get in. Year before I was born that was: 
sixtyfive. And Ristori in Vienna. What is this the right name is? By 
Mosenthal it is. Rachel, is it? No. The scene he was always talking 
about where the old blind Abraham recognises the voice and puts 
his fingers on his face. Nathan’s voice! His son’s voice! I hear the 
voice of Nathan who left his father to die of grief and misery in my 
arms, who left the house of his father and left the God of his father. 
Every word is so deep, Leopold. Poor papa! Poor man! I’m glad I 
didn’t go into the room to look at his face. That day! O, dear! O, 
dear! Ffoo! Well, perhaps it was best for him. Mr Bloom went round 
the corner and passed the drooping nags of the hazard. No use 
thinking of it any more. Nosebag time. Wish I hadn’t met that 
M‘Coy fellow. (U 5.192-212) 
Owing to what Freud – preceded by nineteenth-century theorists 
of “unconscious cerebration” and “mental latency” – would designate 
the return of the repressed, which dominates and impinges upon the 
present, Bloom, like Stephen, has never been able to fully come to terms 
with the deaths in his past or with the displeasing thoughts that he 
always dismisses or avoids. For both characters, traumatic experiences 
in connection with people they have lost may be able to activate other 
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repressed material and justify their deep sense of guilt and unease. Thus 
it seems appropriate that the figure of the deceased Rudolph Virag 
comes back, materialising as a spectre, in the “Circe” episode, which is 
much more adequate for ghostly apparitions, and where the characters 
must inescapably confront their latent fears and anxieties, but also their 
dreams and fantasies. Here Bloom encounters his hidden past, coping 
with his deep anguish over the memory of his father. Virag comes back 
from the underworld to admonish his son and unleash a profound sense 
of guilt linked to his Jewish origins and recanted Judaism: 
([...] A stooped bearded figure appears garbed in the long caftan of an 
elder in Zion and a smokingcap with magenta tassels. Horned spectacles 
hang down at the wings of the nose. Yellow poison streaks are on the drawn 
face.) [...] 
RUDOLPH: What you making down this place? Have you no 
soul? (with feeble vulture talons he feels the silent face of Bloom) Are you 
not my son Leopold, the grandson of Leopold? Are you not my dear 
son Leopold who left the house of his father and left the god of his 
fathers Abraham and Jacob? 
BLOOM: (with precaution) I suppose so, father. Mosenthal. All 
that’s left of him. (U 15.248-64) 
The paternity theme which, also through biblical allusions, was 
already at the heart of the previously quoted excerpt from “Lotus-
Eaters” – and which permeates the whole novel, linking Bloom to both 
his deceased father Rudolph Virag and his dead son Rudy, but also 
connecting Stephen, who has disowned his natural father Simon 
Dedalus, to Bloom as spiritual father – comes back in this passage from 
“Circe” with equally complex intertextual overtones. As with Stephen 
confronting the ghost of his mother assailed by a deep sense of guilt, 
here Bloom’s hallucinatory encounter with his dead father, merging real 
(«yellow poison streaks», «drawn face») and visionary elements, could 
be easily interpreted as a representation of Freudian and pre-Freudian 
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theories of the return of the repressed. However, it may as well be a 
mocking re-enactment of the archetypal scene of Hamlet’s encounter 
with his father’s ghost, as is also evidenced by its script style. In other 
words, Joyce seems to appropriate coeval psychological discourse and 
adapt it to his own concerns as a writer confronting the ghosts of the 
past and the looming figure of Shakespeare as a model and spiritual 
father, with whom he engages in an intermittent dialogue throughout 
the whole novel. Not only does the distorted repetition of certain 
phrases and leitmotifs related to deceased parental figures link the 
characters’ memory to textual memory, but this faculty also involves the 
allusion to, and reworking of, other texts of the literary tradition as 
intertextual memory. It seems clear that, while stressing the importance 
of recollection as a way of sustaining a coherent personal and authorial 
identity, Ulysses also shows a persistent preoccupation with movements 
of the mind which lay outside the control of conscious memory or the 
will, as well as an enduring fascination with multi-layered constructions 
of both self and text. 
In conclusion, the representation of mental phenomena in Joyce’s 
Ulysses seems to resonate with images and concepts that widely 
permeated the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cultural 
sphere through the new science of the mind, chiefly the dualism 
between surface and depth, conscious and unconscious states, voluntary 
and involuntary memory, or the notions of repression and mental 
latency. All of this bears witness to a general interest, long before the 
advent of Freudian psychoanalysis, in the attempt to excavate the 
human psyche and explore the intricate archaeology of the mind. In 
particular, within the novel’s layered representation of consciousness, 
or inside the vast repository of the characters’ personal memories of 
their own past life and experiences, special attention is paid to such 
traumatic events as the loss of parental and filial figures, that Stephen 
and Bloom desperately try to overcome and repress. This shows that, in 
the ever-shifting temporal dimension of Ulysses, the past is not simply 
“received” by the present in a voluntary act of recollection; rather, the 
present is actually “haunted” by the past and its latent traces, which are 
in turn modelled, reinvented and reconstructed by the present itself. 
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Memory in Ulysses has the potential to become a process of creative 
exchange in which past, present and future moments are allowed to 
interconnect. Such fluid representation of time at work in the novel is of 
course closely related to the question of identity and the continuity or 
discontinuity between former and actual selves; or, as Bloom puts it, 
«tomorrow is a new day will be. Past was is today. What now is will then 
morrow as now was be past yester» (U 15.2409-10). Not only does this 
passage reveal, once again, how concepts of memory, time, personal 
identity and text production entwine in the very fabric of Ulysses; it also 
self-reflexively points to the way in which a masterpiece of literary 
modernism was able to merge coeval cultural concerns, such as the focus 
on subjectivity and inner life, with scientific theories firmly rooted in the 
previous century. Just as Joyce’s understanding of the psyche is depicted 
as stratified in Ulysses, so the novel relies upon a bedrock of pre-
Freudian thought. 
Annalisa Federici, Archaeologies of the Mind 
186 
Works Cited 
Barnes, Djuna, “James Joyce”, Vanity Fair, 18 (1922): 65-104. 
Belluc, Sylvain - Bénéjam, Valérie, “Introduction”, Cognitive Joyce, Eds. 
Sylvain Belluc - Valérie Bénéjam, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018: 1-29. 
Bourne Taylor, Jenny - Shuttleworth, Sally (eds.), Embodied Selves: An 
Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830–1890, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1998. 
Brivic, Sheldon, Joyce Between Freud and Jung, Port Washington, 
Kennikat, 1980. 
Carpenter, William, Principles of Mental Physiology, London, Henry S. 
King, 1874. 
Ellenberger, Henri, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and 
Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry, London, Fontana Press, 1994. 
Ellmann, Richard, The Consciousness of Joyce, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1977. 
Id., James Joyce, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Friedman, Susan Stanford, “The Return of the Repressed in Joyce: 
(Self)Censorship and the Making of a Modernist”, The Languages of 
Joyce, Eds. Rosa Maria Bollettieri Bosinelli - Carla Marengo Vaglio - 
Christine Van Boheemen, Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1992: 55-68. 
Id., Joyce: The Return of the Repressed, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1993. 
Gillespie, Michael Patrick, Inverted Volumes Improperly Arranged: James 
Joyce and His Trieste Library, Ann Arbor, UMI Research Press, 1983. 
Id., James Joyce’s Trieste Library: A Catalogue of Materials at the Harry 
Ransom Humanities Research Center, the University of Texas at Austin, 
Austin, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, 1986. 
Groth, Helen, “The Mind as Palimpsest: Art, Dreaming and James 
Sully’s Aesthetics of Latency”, Mindful Aesthetics: Literature and the 
Science of Mind, Eds. Chris Danta - Helen Groth, London, 
Bloomsbury, 2014: 107-21. 
Hamilton, William, Lectures on Metaphysics, Edinburgh, William 
Blackwood, 1877. 
Between, vol. XI, n. 21 (Maggio/May 2021) 
187 
Harrington, Anne, Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain: A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century Thought, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1987. 
Herr, Cheryl, “Art and Life, Nature and Culture, Ulysses”, Joyce’s 
Ulysses: The Larger Perspective, Eds. Robert D. Newman - Weldon 
Thornton, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1987: 19-38. 
Holland, Henry, Chapters on Mental Physiology, London, Longman, 
Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1852. 
Jay, Martin, “Modernism and the Specter of Psychologism”, 
Modernism/Modernity, 3.2 (1996): 93-111. 
Johnson, George, Dynamic Psychology in Modernist British Fiction, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
Joyce, James, Ulysses: The Corrected Text, Ed. Hans Walter Gabler, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986. 
Kimball, Jean, “Family Romance and Hero Myth: A Psychoanalytic 
Context for the Paternity Theme in Ulysses”, James Joyce Quarterly, 
20.2 (1983): 161-73. 
Id., “Jung’s ‘Dual Motherʼ in Joyce’s Ulysses: An Illustrated 
Psychoanalytic Intertext”, Journal of Modern Literature, 17.4 (1991): 
477-90. 
Lewes, George Henry, Problems of Life and Mind, London, Trübner & Co., 
1874. 
Lindberg, Erik. “Returning the Repressed: The Unconscious in Victorian 
and Modernist Narrative”, Narrative, 8.1 (2000): 66-86. 
Lusty, Natalya - Groth, Helen, Dreams and Modernity: A Cultural History, 
New York, Routledge, 2013. 
Maher, Michael, Psychology: Empirical and Rational, London, Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1890. 
Matus, Jill, Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Micale, Mark, “Introduction: The Modernist Mind: A Map”, The Mind of 
Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and 
America, 1880-1940, Ed. Mark Micale, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 2004: 1-19. 
Annalisa Federici, Archaeologies of the Mind 
188 
Rickard, John, Joyce’s Book of Memory: The Mnemotechnic of Ulysses, 
Durham, Duke University Press, 1999. 
Ryan, Judith, The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary 
Modernism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Rylance, Rick, Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850-1880, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Shechner, Mark, Joyce in Nighttown: A Psychoanalytic Inquiry into Ulysses, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. 
Smith, Roger, “The Physiology of the Will: Mind, Body, and Psychology 
in the Periodical Literature, 1855-1875”, Science Serialized: 
Representations of the Sciences in Nineteenth-Century Periodicals, Ed. 
Geoffrey Cantor - Sally Shuttleworth, Cambridge (MA), The MIT 
Press, 2004: 81-110. 
Thurston, Luke, James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Van Mierlo, Wim, “The Freudful Couchmare Revisited: Contextualizing 
Joyce and the New Psychology”, Joyce Studies Annual, 8 (1997): 115-
53. 
Wigan, Arthur, A New View of Insanity: The Duality of the Mind, London, 
Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1844. 
Winter, Alison, Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
  
Between, vol. XI, n. 21 (Maggio/May 2021) 
189 
The Author 
Annalisa Federici  
 
Annalisa Federici holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from 
the University of Perugia. Her main research areas are literary 
modernism, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, formal aspects in fiction, and 
the relationship between writing and psychological processes. She is the 
author of the books Il linguaggio e la realtà. La narrativa modernista di 
Virginia Woolf e James Joyce (2011) and “In a Kind of Retrospective 
Arrangement”: Essays on James Joyce and Memory (2016), as well as of a 
number of critical essays on Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Samuel 
Beckett, Ford Madox Ford, Nathalie Sarraute, Michel Butor. She is 
currently working on Joyce, little magazines, expatriate autobiography 
and celebrity culture in interwar Paris. 
 
Email: annalisafederici3@gmail.com 
The Article  
Date sent: 15/02/2021 
Date accepted: 15/04/2021 
Date published: 30/05/2021 
How to cite this article 
Federici, Annalisa, “Archaeologies of the Mind: James Joyce’s Ulysses 
and Pre-Freudian Psychology of the Unconscious”, Forme e metamorfosi 
del ‘non conscio’ prima e dopo Freud: ‘ideologie scientifiche’ e rappresentazioni 
letterarie, Eds. R. Behrens - F. Bouchard - S. Contarini - C. Murru - G. 
Perosa, Between, XI.21 (2021), http://www.betweenjournal.it/ 
